Date: Tue, 19 Mar 1996 07:03:30 +0100

To: transpsych-l@asylum.org

From: Thomas.Jordan@geography.gu.se (Thomas.Jordan)

Subject: Essay on feeling (long one)

Thinking and feeling in the evolution of consciousness

One month ago I tried to initiate a discussion on this list about alternative paths of personal development. I will try to take this theme a little bit further now, because I still find Ken Wilber’s framework biased towards "thinking." Before I start, I would like to emphasize that my discussion more concerns form than substance. I believe that Wilber is perfectly aware of where the heart of the matter is to be found. However, by giving Piaget and "formal operations" such a central place in the description of the "mental-egoic" or "rational" structure of consciousness (see e.g. Sex, Ecology, Spirituality, ch. 5-6) there is a risk of inflating the role of reason in a narrow sense, while devaluing or neglecting the role of non-verbal operations (feeling, intuition, relating). There are two important issues involved in this. One concerns the risk of not seeing the qualities and achievements of people who don’t happen to have a very differentiated thinking function, but have developed the full potential of the mental-ego or the existential structure using other functions (is this possible??). The other issue concerns the core of consciousness development. The Piagetian view maintains that cognitive structures define the evolution of consciousness. I want to investigate if there are not even more fundamental processes going on.

In "Sex, Ecology, Spirituality" (p. 231-235) Wilber characterizes the "rational" structure in the following way: The emergence of ‘formal operations’ means the ability to conceive of hypothetical possibilities: "reason is a space of possibilities." On this bedrock the following elements develop: a) The ability to grasp mutual relationships as systems (ecological awareness). "All the possible relations that things can have with each other [can] be held in awareness." Wholes and parts can be perceived simultaneously, as well as their mutual interaction. b) The ability to take different perspectives (points of view) and see these different perspectives in relation to each other. Hereby one understands the relativity of one’s own perspective. c) A "non-anthropocentric" perspective, i.e. the ability to see the proper place of human beings in the cosmos. This entails the possibility of a less arrogant attitude in relation to our own role in the world. d) The conventions of the society can be judged from the perspective of universal principles (rights, responsibilities) e) The person can develop self-reflection and introspection. f) The mind becomes experimental and relies on evidence to settle matters.

I have spent some time the last few days with the book "Lectures on Jung’s Typology," with contributions by Marie-Louise von Franz and James Hillman. I will focus on the "feeling function," since feeling and thinking are supposed to be mutually exclusive. Could a person with a highly differentiated feeling function but a rather undifferentiated thinking function achieve the features that Wilber mentions as hallmarks of the mental-egoic level?

The feeling function in the Jungian sense is not feelings, affect, intuition, sensing, or Eros, but a mode of relating to the world and to oneself using feeling as an instrument. The Jungian conception of the feeling function emphasizes the assignment of value judgments. Hillman (p. 110): "In making judgments the feeling function balances values, compares tones and qualities, weighs importance and decides upon the values it discovers. The feeling function on a more primitive level is mainly a reaction of yes and no, like and dislike, acceptance and rejection. As it develops, there forms in us a subtle appreciation of values, and even of value systems, and our judgments of feeling then rest more and more on a rational hierarchy, whether it be in the realm of aesthetic taste, ethical goods, or social forms and human relationships." The Jungians call the feeling function for rational but not logical, meaning that feeling judgments are highly consistent and ordered, but are not based on conceptual propositions.

It is far more difficult to identify stages in the development of the feeling function than in cognitive development, but for the sake of the argument I have tried to formulate some crude stages (von Franz and Hillman would protest wildly over this): STAGE 1: Feeling is extremely undifferentiated and dominated by body states: pleasure and displeasure, i.e. absolute and one-sided valuations. The assignment of feeling values is bound to the immediate present, and has little consistency over time. The feeling function is body-bound, and largely unadapted to the social environment. There is no, or only little, ability to operate with feelings or emotions, i.e. control them and use them intentionally in order to influence the environment. The feelings have the person rather than the other way round. STAGE 2: The feeling function is gradually differentiated by the development of personal dispositions with some permanence over time: sympathies and antipathies. There is a beginning ability to use one’s own feelings to influence situations and relationships. Feelings towards persons, objects or events are still not based on an accurate experiencing of the complex features of the objects. One-sided feeling qualities are attributed to the objects by projection of wish-fulfilling qualities or fear or other negative psychic elements. The low differentiation of the feeling function makes the person susceptible to others’ feelings and emotions. STAGE 3: The feeling function now starts to differentiate in two important ways: (a) more nuances of feeling can be held simultaneously towards various aspects of the same object, leading to a more complex and perhaps ambiguous evaluation; (b) the values become increasingly differentiated, and the individual starts becoming more aware of personally held values. Increasing ability to sort out what aspects of persons, objects or events one likes and dislikes, without having to make sweeping decisions. More complex and enduring feelings develop, such as love. STAGE 4: Highly differentiated values and finely discriminating feelings. Great skill in using the feeling function intentionally, e.g. as a sense of appropriate timing (or’tact,’ Hillman: 173) in dealing with various situations and different kinds of people. An intimate sense of one’s own spectrum of values allows the development of a balanced and stable adaptation of the self in relation to the norms and convention of the society (Hillman talks about ‘style,’ p. 172). This implies a firm sense of individuality while adapting to the expectations of the environment. An agility in the realm of feelings develop, giving the person a great deal of freedom. One may, for example, choose to ignore one’s own negative feelings toward a person, and instead emphasize the agreeable aspects in order to create a viable working relationship. Hillman (p. 112): "The feeling answer to ‘Do you like him?’ is ‘It depends.’ It depends: on the situation, on what I mean by ‘like,’ on what aspects of him I am asked about, and so on. The feeling function sorts all this out […]." One no longer falls victim to one’s own value judgments or feelings. A crucial achievement is the ability to contain one’s own negative and contradictory feelings and emotions without having to repress or ban them, nor to act them out. STAGE 5: Development of feeling to experience communion with a transcendental reality. Through feeling in relationships or as a general life feeling, there is a sense of participating in the cosmos as a living wholeness.

Now, which of Wilber’s criteria of the rational structure can be reached using mainly the feeling function? a) the ability to grasp concretely experienced mutual relationships can be achieved, but not operating with purely hypothetical relationships. b) different perspectives can be felt and evaluated using the feeling function, insofar as feeling has a chance to experience the other directly. c) a sense of one’s own appropriate place in a larger universe can be very intensely experienced with the feeling function, perhaps with more reality-sense than using thinking. d) conventions and norms can be balanced with individual values, which adds a dimension to the principles of the thinking mind. It is a question of justice vs. care. The care orientation has little to do with formal operations, but is deeply dependent on differentiated feeling, commitment to personal values, and an ability to resonate emotionally with other people. e) self-reflection and introspection is not necessarily best made with the thinking function. I have little use of being able to theorize about my Oedipus complex. It is more valuable to have an intimate familiarity with my motivations and feelings, and a highly developed skill in dealing with my own (negative) emotions. That is a gift of a differentiated feeling function. f) mental experiments is not the realm of the feeling function, but a high degree of sensitivity for the unique features of every person and every situation is.

The conclusion of this experiment is that the feeling function cannot replace the thinking function with the same end-results. Feeling is not very well suited to juggle with hypothetical propositions. Feeling depends on either the presence of persons and objects, or a lively imagination faculty in order to relate to absent or hypothetical persons and events. On the other hand, thinking has also some weak spots, e.g. in the problem of transferring theoretical insight to actual practice in dealings with one’s own inner world or with external people and situations. Not surprisingly, we probably need to develop several psychological faculties in order to realize the potential of each consciousness structure. However, it would be a mistake to focus only on thinking.

I believe that the core of consciousness evolution in the ego realms (i.e. not necessarily in the transcendental stages) is not to be found in thinking operations *per se*, but in a gradual differentiation of the psychic functions by which we become aware of the natural, the social, and the internal psychological worlds. This differentiation leads to identification with ever larger systems or contexts, where our own little egos become increasingly relativized, and our motivation includes ever larger parts of the cosmos. Thinking is of course extremely important in this process, but so are feeling, intuition, and sensation.

Now, most of you didn't get this far by reading, I suppose. For me these issues are important, since I am trying to apply an evolutionary perspective on social issues. Any reaction would be welcome.

Thomas

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von FRANZ, M-L and J. HILLMAN (1986) Lectures on Jung’s Typology, Woodstock: Spring Publications. Originally published in 1971.

P.S. I also have an alternative 10-stage model of the development of the feeling function, based on an interpretation of the Eros and Psyche myth by Juliet Sharman-Burke and Liz Greene. If you are interested, I’ll send it.